The team is joined by GuestKats Mirko Brüß, Rosie Burbidge, Nedim Malovic, Frantzeska Papadopolou, Mathilde Pavis, and Eibhlin Vardy
InternKats: Rose Hughes, Ieva Giedrimaite, and Cecilia Sbrolli
SpecialKats: Verónica Rodríguez Arguijo (TechieKat), Hayleigh Bosher (Book Review Editor), and Tian Lu (Asia Correspondent).

Sunday, 25 February 2018

PTAB puts a stop to Allergan's tribal sovereign immunity gamble

Substance over form matters in RESTASIS IPR dispute
Back in September 2017, the AmeriKat posted about the transactional strategy executed by Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe to avoid the jurisdiction of the PTAB. 

Allergan transferred all of its Orange Book listed patents for RESTASIS® to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe who, in turn, exclusively licensed back its patents to Allergan. In exchange, the Tribe received $13.75 million upon execution and is eligible to receive $15 million in annual royalties. The purpose of this transactional manoeuvre was to put the patents beyond the reach of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).  Mylan had instituted inter partes review (IPR) proceedings against Allergan back in December 2016.  Mylan was later joined by Teva and Akorn.

The transactional move, argued Allergan, did not mean that their patents could not be challenged in federal court and it would have no effect on their pending abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) patent litigation (recently subject to a five day trial in the Eastern District of Texas).  Despite such assurances, the move caused quite a bit of debate in the press and in the Senate.

On Friday, the PTAB ruled that the Tribe could not claim sovereign immunity to avoid the IPR.  Although there was an interesting discussion on whether tribal immunity applied to IPRs, for the AmeriKat it was the finding that the deal structure meant that Allergan retained ownership interests such that the IPR could continue as Allergan being a "patent owner".  Mylan et al argued that the IPR could continue because Allergan was the "true owner of the challenged patents".

Substance matters more than form and if the substance of the transaction has a party retaining all substantial rights under the patent, then they are a "patent owner" irrespective of whether the transaction characterizes them as such (see Waterman v Mackenzie (1891); Speedplay v Behop (2000); Alfred E Mann Foundation v Cochlear Corp (2010)).  Although relevant, a party's intention in entering into the agreement is not dispositive (Azure Networks v CSR (2014)).  Instead, from factors set out in Azure, the courts examine the rights transferred and the rights retained as follows:
"(1) the nature and scope of the right to bring suit;
(2) the exclusive right to make, use, and sell products or services under the patent;
(3) the scope of the licensee’s right to sublicense;
(4) the reversionary rights to the licensor following termination or expiration of the license;
(5) the right of the licensor to receive a portion of the proceeds from litigating or licensing the patent; (6) the duration of the license rights;
(7) the ability of the licensor to supervise and control the licensee’s activities;
(8) the obligation of the licensor to continue paying maintenance fees; and
(9) any limits on the licensee's right to assign its interests in the patent."
The PTAB held that the terms of the licence-back between Allergan and the Tribe transferred "all substantial rights" back to Allergan.  They were thus the "patent owner" for the purposes of continuing the IPR.

In reaching its decision, the PTAB took the following factors into consideration:
  • Allergan retained the important and exclusive right to sue for patent infringement.  The courts have stated that this is a "key factor" in determining whether an agreement results in a transfer of ownership (Apex Eyewear v Miracle Optics (2006)).  This was the most important factor for the PTAB. 
  • Allergan retained rights to exploit the patents "for all FDA-approved uses in the United States".   Because the claims of the patents are directed to pharmaceutical compositions and methods used to treat human medical conditions, it was not shown that there could be any other commercially relevant ways to practice the invention without FDA approval.  Thus, Allergan's exclusive rights were not limited in any meaningful sense.  
  • The Tribe has no ability to control or veto Allergan's ability to sub-licence the patents.  
  • The Tribe has no reversionary rights - the rights granted to Allergan are "perpetual" and "irrevocable" continuing until the patents expire or until all the claims are held invalid in a non-appealable final judgment.  
  • The Tribe does not receive any proceeds from litigation or other licensing activities, it also does not have the ability to freely assign its interests in the patents.   
The PTAB also concluded that the Tribe was not an "indispensible party" to the IPR.  Accordingly, the Tribe's motion to terminate the IPRs was denied and that they could continue with Allergan as the patent owner.  The AmeriKat wonders whether, even assuming the Tribe could win on the sovereign immunity basis on appeal, the terms of the transaction are such that the point is rendered moot.  Has the PTAB thus effectively closed off this type of transaction in the future?   Is there a work-around that could ever make this type of transaction effective?

The news of the decision came later on Friday afternoon, so the AmeriKat has yet to see any published comments from either party (see Allergan press releases here and here).  But it is only a matter of time before we hear whether this fight will reach the federal courts. 

L'Oreal v RN Ventures - The Registered Design Perspective

The '747 Design (plainly not a plane)
L'Oréal Société Anonyme RN Ventures Ltd (Rev 1) [2018] EWHC 173, the recent decision by Mr Justice Carr, has been given the Amerikat treatment here and here.  As a non-patenty Guest Kat, my eye was particularly drawn to the registered design claim which (spoiler alert!) succeeded.

One of my favourite features of design cases is identifying the informed user.  In this case, the judge considered it was the "observant user of powered skin brushes".

The 747 was sufficiently different from the prior art and design corpus to be novel but was it sufficiently different to have individual character?

Carr J confirmed that following the CJEU's decision in Easy Sanitary (Cases C-361/15P and C-405/15 Easy Sanitary (21 September 2017), ECLI:EU:C:2017:720)"it is not necessary for it to be established that the informed user would know of an item of prior art for it to be considered as part of the design corpus" [152].

The design corpus included a wide variety of powered skin brushes (and one manual but undated example which was excluded from consideration).

As Carr J noted "[a]t a high level of generality, [the design corpus] are cylindrical or wedge-shaped devices, with a single brush head, with elongated handles with straight or slightly waisted sides, with some form of attachment area for the brush head" [161].

By contrast, "[t]he 747 Design is of a sculpted shape which narrows in the middle into an hourglass with a very distinctive bulbous head with curved sides and castellations around the brush. The issue is one of overall impression, and in my judgment, the 747 Design looks very different to the design corpus and represents a significant departure from the design corpus."
The design corpus

The expert evidence confirmed that there was a "wide degree of design freedom".  The impact of design freedom has been considered by both the General Court in Kwang Yang Motor v OHIM (T-10/08) [2011] E.C.R. II-265, ECLI:EU:T:2011:446 at [32] to [33] and the Court of Appeal in Procter & Gamble Co v Reckitt Benckiser (UK) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 936[2008] FSR 8 

Carr J summarised the principles from these cases as "The greater the designer’s freedom, the wider the scope of the monopoly; conversely, the more limitations on design freedom, the narrower the scope of the monopoly."  Consequently, L'Oréal had a wide monopoly.

The overall impression discussion involved the usual poetic analysis of each feature (e.g.  "The base of the brush has castellated features topped by a concentric circular arrangement of bristle tufts") ultimately the question was one of overall impression.  Following the findings that the 747 Design is significantly different from the design corpus, and there is significant design freedom, he reached the conclusion that each of the Magnitone Products (i.e. the Defendant's products) creates the same overall impression as the 747 Design [183].

As David Stone pointed out at a recent IBIL event on designs, there is not a single example of a design which has been held to be valid and infringed by the Court of Appeal.  Given that RN Ventures was held to have also infringed L'Oreal's patent, the design is less crucial than it might otherwise have been but it would be interesting to see how the design fares in the Court of Appeal.

Saturday, 24 February 2018

Repair or reconstruction: Where do you draw the line for exhaustion under patent law?

What can the buyer of a patented product do with the product in question under the doctrine of exhaustion? Stated otherwise: when does the use of a patented invention fall outside the scope of what a buyer is allowed or even expected to do and   instead enters the grey zone of patent infringement? This question becomes even more compelling  when it comes to drawing the line between repair (permissible from a patent law perspective) and reconstruction (which constitutes patent infringement).

The difficulties in distinguishing between the two, repair or reconstruction, becomes more important when it comes to products that need refilling and  third parties are thus given the opportunity  (along with providing  refills) to also provide substitutes  for parts of the patented invention. There is  certainly room for further interpretation of the scope of the principle of exhaustion with regards to repair/reconstruction, since the caselaw relating to  it is  limited.

The German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) decision,  in the case of “Trommeleinheit” [Drum Unit] – court docket: X ZR 55/16, GRUR-Prax 2018, 50 of the 24th  of October 2017, provides a valuable contribution in this respect. The FCJ, has now clarified that the central point of reference, when determining whether it is a question of repair or reconstruction, is the technical effect of the invention and whether this is reflected in the replaced element.

 The case

The patentee, Canon K.K., manufactures and distributes copying machines and printers as well as their respective toner cartridges. In the toner market, Canon has to compete with companies that reuse toner cartridges by replacing the photosensitive drum with a new drum. Canon filed a law suit and claimed direct patent infringement of claim 1 of its European Patent  2 087 407 in Germany.  Claim 1 covers a photosensitive drum unit, and further independent claims cover a cartridge and an electrophotographic image-forming apparatus, both of which  encompass a drum unit. The defendants distribute recycled printer cartridges, which may be used instead of the cartridges manufactured and distributed by the plaintiff.
Both the Düsseldorf District Court and the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal found that the defendant, by substituting the drum, had engaged in act equivalent to reconstruction i.e. an act of infringement.
The ruling of the FCJ

A previous ruling of the FCJ, namely the Palettenbehälter II case, provided  useful guidance  by establishing that the starting point for determining if  a certain use constitutes repair or reconstruction is to ask whether the identity of the processed object is maintained, despite the replacement of components, or alternatively  whether the replacement of the component constitutes the making of a new patented product. An important parameter is whether the components in question are of such a kind that their replacement can  usually be expected during the working life of the device. If this is the case, the use (the replacement of the part) per se is not an infringement, and a further aspect then needs to be investigated, namely, whether the technical effect of the invention is reflected in the components replaced. If this is the case, then the use constitutes reconstruction and thus patent infringement.

The FCJ, just as previously the Regional Court and the Higher Regional Court, concluded that the relevant point of reference was the claimed unit. However, and contrary to the lower courts, the FCJ ruled that,  in the specific case  before it, members of the trade would have  no opinion  whether replacement of the drum is to be expected during the working life of the drum unit, since the drum unit was  not sold separately, but only sold as part of the cartridges. Since the  the “opinion of the trade” criterion was not available, the FCJ applied the second step in the Palettenbehälter II test, whereby what is determinative is whether inventive character was embodied in the replaced spare part. The Court concluded "no", and thus  the action of the defendants did not constitute infringement.
The conclusions

In the view of this Kat, The FCJ’s ruling is not surprising, since it confirms its previous ruling in ““Palettenbehälter II”. The ruling in “Trommeleinheit” is nevertheless  noteworthy  because it relates to the application of previous case law in a rather special case, namely where a patented (drum) unit  is exclusively placed on the market as part of a comprehensive device (the toner cartridge) rather than as a stand-alone product. This ruling has also entailed a slight adjustment in how the distinction between repair and reconstruction is to be made, namely, changing the focus from how the product is viewed in the trade in favour of focusing on the objective aspect of technical effect as embodied in the repaired spare part. The outcome in the specific case might also influence how patent applicants will claim their inventions going forward, so as to guarantee that the claims cover all of the invention’s different components and protect the inventive character of the invention at all possible levels.

Friday, 23 February 2018

Friday Fantasies

IPKat is here with your weekly update of the latest news and upcoming events in IP! 

Artificial Intelligence - Training Program and Call for Papers

The Centre of International and Intellectual Property Studies (CEIPI), University of Strasbourg, is offering a new advanced training program in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Intellectual Property, to be held on 24-26 May 2018. Registration and further details can be found here.

AI is certainly a hot topic. Elsewhere, the Italian intellectual property journal Aida has issued a call for papers on AI and intellectual property relating to European or Italian law. The deadline for abstract submission is 30 March 2018. Final papers can be written in Italian or English. See here for further details.

Conference on IP disputes - Vienna 

A free conference on "IP disputes and their effective resolution" is being held in Vienna next week, 2 March 2018. The conference aims to provide an opportunity for relaxed networking between members of the IP and the arbitration/dispute resolution communities. Details of the full program, speakers and registration can be found here

Young Lawyers Contest - France

The Academy of European Law (ERA) is organizing a "Young Lawyers Contest" in cooperation with Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), to be held on 6-7 September 2018 at the ERA Conference Centre in Trier. The aim of the contest will be to bring together young lawyers and to spotlight the importance of European law for their future legal practice. Contestants will be judged on their knowledge of European law and advocacy skills. Further details can be found here. Young lawyers wishing to compete should contact their relevant participating Bar before 12 April 2018. See here for a list of participating Bars.

Hague System Seminar - Denmark

On 15 March 2018MARQUES is hosting a seminar in collaboration with WIPO on the practical aspects of the functioning and use of the Hague system, with a focus on providing European users of the system with guidance on Japan, the Republic of Korea or USA designations under the Hague Agreement. The seminar will be held at the offices of NJORD Law Firm in Copenhagen. See here for further details and registration. 

IP inclusive event
Kat revising for EQEs

IP Out is holding an evening event on 14 March 2018 on the topic of "The Gender Spectrum: What should firms be doing and why?", hosted by Bird & Bird, London. As with all IP inclusive events, everyone is welcome. Further details and free registration can be found here

More UK IPO intellectual videos!

Did your kids enjoy Nancy and the Meerkats? Are they looking for some more IP-related fun? Do not fear, the UK IPO has launched a new series, Meet the Malwares, in which four less-than-lovable characters, Malware, Ransomware, Adware and Spyware, warn us of the danger of downloading movies from illegal sites. 

Good luck message

Finally, good luck from IPKat to everyone across Europe taking their pre-EQE or EQEs next week! 

EPO looking for new legally qualified members of the Boards of Appeal

Fancy a trip to Munich in April?  The Boards of Appeal
are looking to hire...
Via a long-time IPKat friend, comes news that the European Patent Office (EPO) is looking to appoint new legally qualified members of the Boards of Appeal (Board 3.1.01) in Munich. Details of the post can be found here (all vacancies can be found here).

The blurb from the announcement reads:
"The European Patent Office (EPO) is the second-largest intergovernmental organisation in Europe, employing almost 7 000 staff from over 30 countries. The EPO strives to support innovation and promote a knowledge-based society in Europe. Its mission is to secure the highest quality standards in patenting.
The persons appointed will be legally qualified members of the boards of appeal of the EPO, which under the European Patent Convention have final-instance jurisdiction with respect to European patents.

A member of the boards of appeal performs duties of a judicial nature fully independently, not bound by any instructions and in compliance only with the provisions of the European Patent Convention (Article 23(3) EPC).

Main duties
  • Participation in all written and oral procedural stages of proceedings of the Legal Board and the technical boards of appeal 
  • As rapporteur: making proposals for communications to the parties, preparing draft decisions and oral proceedings, including all related tasks, and, where necessary, taking evidence
  • After gaining experience in the duties of a legally qualified member of the boards of appeal, helping to train new board members and assistants
  • Taking part in the meetings of the Legal Board"
The closing date for applications is 30 March 2018.

German FCJ: doctors can have their profile deleted from rating site - but can they?

A healthy ECG
Germans like to rate things online. We have rating sites for hotels, restaurants, playgrounds and of course - doctors. Jameda is one (of about 10) such websites that focusses on user-generated, anonymous reviews of doctors. 

It has been around for over 10 years, lists around 250.000 German doctors and attracts more than 10m visitors each month. These numbers show how important it is for doctors who appear on the website to be described in a positive light by their patients in order to remain competitive.

Jameda offered two types of listings for doctors. The first, ‘basic’, option included the name, academic title, specialization (if any), address and opening hours. This ‘basic’ option was free, and in fact doctors did not even have to sign up. Instead Jameda has always tried to (proactively) list every doctor in Germany on its website. Next to each listing, the average of the available user ratings was presented in the form of a grade, similar to (German) school grades that range from 1 (best) to 6 (worst). Users could also leave feedback in the form of written reviews in addition to the grading system.

A ‘premium’ option was also available for doctors. This package had the following benefits: doctors could add a profile picture and additional information about their practice. The most notable feature however was that when viewing a ‘basic’ profile, Jameda would show (marked as ‘advertisement’) profiles of ‘premium’ users in the surrounding area that had higher user ratings than the ‘basic’ profile that was being viewed. When ‘premium’ profiles were viewed, no such advertisements were shown.

Obviously, doctors that were subjected to negative reviews either tried to have those reviews deleted or went a step further and asked for their whole profile to be deleted from the website.

let's hope the doctor is good!
The 2014 case

In 2014, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) decided upon a case in which a gynaecologist sought to have his profile deleted from the website. 

In an interesting turn of events, the distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘premium’ profiles was not ruled upon by the courts due to procedural reasons. 

To make a long story short: the plaintiff’s attorneys failed to introduce the relevant facts to the case. As a result, the FCJ looked upon the site as if all profiles were treated equally by Jameda. This turned out to be a decisive factor.

The court’s decision in 2014 was in favour of Jameda, dismissing the doctor’s request for deletion of his profile. According to the judges, Jameda’s processing of doctors’ data is governed by § 29 BDSG (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, the Federal Data Protection Act). The norm states that:

“the commercial collection, storage, modification or use of personal data for the purpose of transfer, in particular when this serves the purposes of advertising, the activities of credit inquiry agencies or trading in addresses shall be admissible if

1.  there is no reason to assume that the data subject has a legitimate interest in excluding such collection, storage or modification”.

As the required ‘legitimate interest’ (here: of the doctor) can only be assumed after balancing the opposing rights and interests at issue, the court looked at the doctor’s right to informational self-determination and Jameda’s and the reviewing users’ right to freedom of expression, while the professional freedom of both parties was also taken into account.

The FCJ conceded that the inclusion of the doctor in Jameda’s database was able to affect the doctor significantly. Reviews are able to influence patients’ decision which doctor to visit, as well as the doctor’s social and professional reputation. However, the court continued, these aspects only touch the plaintiff’s ‘social sphere’ as opposed to the ‘private’ and ‘secret’ spheres, which are more worthy of protection. Reviews that were factually wrong or otherwise offensive could be removed via a notification process that was implemented by Jameda. In the case at hand, no such reviews regarding the plaintiff were present, he ‘merely’ objected being included in the database at all.

Weighing against these interests of the plaintiff, the FCJ highlighted a considerable interest of the general public with regards to medical services and their quality. While it would indeed be possible for Jameda to continue its business after removing the plaintiff’s data, the judges viewed this as a danger to the informative value of the website as a whole. There would be a good chance that many doctors with negative reviews would ask for removal of their profiles, which would impede Jameda’s goal to present a ‘complete picture’ of medical services in Germany.

In the end, Jameda’s rights and interests outweighed those of the doctor, and his profile remained online.

The 2018 FCJ ruling

Two years after the first Jameda verdict, another doctor took offence not only at some negative reviews (she had an average grade of 4.7), but also at her being included in the database at all. She also highlighted and criticized that other doctors’ profiles (those of ‘premium’ users) were shown next to her entry in the database, and initiated court proceedings in 2016.

While both the Court of first instance and the Court of appeal rejected the plaintiff’s claims, the FCJ sided with her and granted the request for removal of her profile. To this date, only the press release of the FCJ is available. It will be a couple of months before the written reasons are published.

For now, we can confirm that indeed the distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘premium’ profiles was the decisive factor. The judges stress that by providing different information about doctors, depending on whether they are paying customers or not, Jameda had left its position as a ‘neutral’ information facilitator. This became especially visible (or rather ‘invisible’) when viewing the profile of a ‘premium’ doctor, whose profile was presented without showing any nearby alternatives, as opposed to ‘basic’ profiles, that were shown alongside other doctors who had better reviews. This shift in Jameda’s function resulted in a lower weight of the right to freedom of expression on behalf of Jameda, the court found. When balanced against the interests and rights of the plaintiff, the latter came out on top, resulting in the opposite outcome compared to the earlier case.

Future prospects

Reading only the headline of this week’s ruling one could expect a new wave of claims for deletion from the Jameda website by doctors who are discontent with their ratings or just not happy to be in the database at all. However, Jameda appears to have put a stop on such claims before they even gained any traction. On the day of the FCJ’s decision, Jameda stopped the practice the FCJ criticized and is now no longer advertising ‘premium’ customers’ profiles on ‘basic’ customers entries. As a result, we are now back to the situation the FCJ has ruled upon in 2014, meaning it is very unlikely doctors will be able to have their profiles removed. While this move by Jameda might make many of their paying customers unhappy, it should effectively put a stop to further claims for the deletion of profiles. It remains to be seen if the status quo will be contested by other doctors who do not want to be included in Jameda’s website.

Thursday, 22 February 2018

Top 10 issues from submissions before UK Supreme Court in Warner-Lambert v Actavis second medical use battle

The IPKat and team watching last week's Supreme
Court hearing...
Like many across the IP world, the IPKat was glued to his computer screen last week watching the drama unfold in the UK Supreme Court between Warner-Lambert and Actavis/Mylan.  The IPKat's friends, Katie Cambrook, Rachel Mumby and Claire Phipps-Jones of Bristows LLP, attended in person and, with the support of a team of other keen watchers in place each day, have summarized their Top 10 issues coming out of the hearing.  The IPKat expects that the very vocal panel of judges in the form of Lord Mance, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Hodge and Lord Briggs will be grappling with these issues and much more in preparing their judgment. For those who missed the action, you can watch the recordings on the UK Supreme Court's website here.  Over to Katie, Rachel and Claire: 
"Last week, the UK Supreme Court held a 4-day hearing in Warner-Lambert v Actavis et al., the latest (perhaps last?) installment in the long-running Lyrica® saga concerning the validity and infringement of Warner-Lambert’s (Pfizer) second medical use patent with Swiss-type claims covering pregabalin for the treatment of pain. The central issues in dispute in this appeal were the role of plausibility in the test for sufficiency of disclosure, the allowability of post-trial amendments, and the direct and indirect infringement of Swiss-type claims. 
As readers may recall (see all previous IPKat posts here), the Court of Appeal had upheld Arnold J’s finding that inter alia claim 3 (to neuropathic pain, the only claim which is the subject of the Supreme Court appeal) of Pfizer’s patent was invalid for lack of sufficiency. The Court of Appeal had held that the data in the patent, which related to animal models of inflammatory pain, rendered it plausible that pregabalin would be effective in treating peripheral neuropathic pain but not central neuropathic pain. Whilst such data may have encouraged the skilled person to test the effectiveness of pregabalin in the treatment of peripheral neuropathic pain (rendering that invention plausible), the same was not true of central neuropathic pain and therefore not of neuropathic pain as a whole, rendering the claim insufficient.
The Court of Appeal also upheld the rejection of Pfizer’s application to amend the claim down to peripheral neuropathic pain after the first instance judgment had been handed down as being an abuse of process. On infringement, the Court of appeal provided obiter guidance, proposing a test for direct infringement based on the manufacturer’s knowledge or reasonable foreseeability of the ultimate intentional use for the patented indication, qualified by a caveat that the element of intention can be negated where the manufacturer has taken all reasonable steps to prevent infringement. On indirect infringement, the Court of Appeal reiterated that what is required is that means are provided which are for putting the invention into effect, but that there is no requirement for a downstream act of manufacture. 
On appeal, the UK Supreme Court panel was composed of Lords Mance, Sumption, Hodge, Reed and Briggs. Tom Mitcheson QC argued Pfizer’s case on plausibility, and Lord Pannick QC took over the case on abuse of process and infringement, with both sharing issues of construction. For Actavis/Mylan, Adrian Speck QC made submissions on plausibility and infringement, with Pushpinder Saini QC dealing with the remaining issues of construction and abuse of process. Michael Silverleaf QC also made submissions on behalf of the Secretary of State for Health. A number of interveners also made written submissions that were occasionally referred to in the course of the hearing.
Our “Top 10” points of interest or questions arising from the submissions before the Supreme Court are as follows:

On plausibility 
1.  Is plausibility a disease that is spreading and which must tackled by the Court before it is too late, as argued by Pfizer? 
2.  Alternatively, should the test for plausibility and obviousness be the same (i.e. require a reasonable expectation of success), or must the patent show a direct effect on the mechanism of the claimed disease, as argued Actavis/Mylan?
On abuse of process
3. Should the patentee have a right to amend following them being made aware of the judicial decision, as is the case before the OD of the EPO and some other national courts? 
4. Should the rules on partially valid patents apply to “partially valid claims”, as argued by Pfizer?
5. Is it disproportionate not to allow amendment post-trial where any prejudice could arguably be adequately dealt with in costs?
On construction
6. Pfizer suggested that the “validating principle” from contract law should be imported into patent law. Is it right to draw an analogy between a patent and a bilateral instrument such as a contract or deed, or a regulation which the court must interpret to ensure its validity? 
On infringement 
7. Does this issue require a judicial rewriting of s60 of the Patents Act, as initially argued by Pfizer?
8. Or is this simply a case of construction of the word “for”? 
9. How important is the label in determining infringement? 
10. Is it relevant that patents with Swiss-form claims will disappear from the patent landscape in the future, as argued by the Secretary of State for Health?
At the end of the hearing, the panel thanked counsel for all parties for their submissions and announced that it would take “some time” to prepare the judgment. If last year’s Supreme Court case in Actavis v Eli Lilly is to be taken as a guide, the Court may take around three months to make its judgment available."

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